This article seeks to contribute to a better understanding of the role of the state in influencing the formation of global cities in emerging economies, and highlights the complexity of this role due to challenging external environments, divergent interests of state actors, and socio-economic and institutional constraints that these actors are under. At an empirical level, it examines the progress of Shanghai in its state-led development as an emerging global city and the respective roles of the national and local governments in this process.
Introduction
The formation of the global/world cities and the role of the state in this process is seriously under-explored (Sassen 1991 (Sassen & 2001 Friedmann 1995 Friedmann & 2001 Olds & Yeung 2004) . Despite this, however, urban planners and city authorities, especially those in emerging economies, have demonstrated remarkable interest in state-led global/world city formation (Olds and Yeung 2004) Shanghai's re-emergence as a leading world city had been anticipated. In fact, along with Hong Kong and Singapore, Shanghai was for the period of 1919-1939 the largest of the three 'sub-regional' financial centres in Asia (Jones 1992) . But the city declined, first due to the Japanese occupation (1937) (1938) (1939) (1940) (1941) (1942) (1943) (1944) (1945) , and then, after the foundation of the PRC in 1949, a socialist system that practised 'financial repression' and an insular planned economy (Jao 2003) . With the rise of the Chinese economy following its reform and open-door policy from the late 1970s, however, it is widely expected (e.g . Friedmann 1995; Mainelli & Yeandle 2007 ) that Shanghai will once again become a significant player in international finance. On the other hand, turning Shanghai into a global/world city has been a much publicised Chinese 'state project' since at least the early 1990s, if not earlier (Zhang 2003; Wu 2009 ). However, numerous reviews of Shanghai's prospects (Shi & Hamnett 2002; Jao 2003 
I. Perspectives on Global/World City Formation and the Role of the State
In order to develop an analytical framework for the empirical analysis, we first introduce the concept of the global/world city. We then discuss theoretically the scope for leading cities in emerging economies to become global/world cities. Finally, the potential role of the state in this formation is considered.
Defining world/global cities
Although Hall (1966) did much to popularise the idea of world cities, it was Friedman and Wolff (1982) who undertook the conceptual ground-breaking work. In the context of economic restructuring in the world-economy starting from the 1970s and adopting a world-systems perspective, they conceptualised the world city as (i) 'an instrument for the control of production and market organization' by transnational capital and
(ii) a junction between the national economy and the world economy.
They saw these cities as 'major sites for the concentration and accumulation of international capital', tightly connected with each other and occurring 'exclusively in core and semi-core regions' (p. 59). Friedmann's (1986) subsequent formulation of 'The
World City Hypothesis' further linked these cities to the 'new international division of labour', characterising them as the 'basing points' for global capital.
In contrast, Sassen (1991) distinguishes 'global cities' from 'world cities' and insists that global cities are a new type of economic coordinating units, specific to the era of globalisation since the 1980s. In the context of spatially dispersed, but globally integrated economic activities, global cities function 'as command points in the organization of the world economy, as sites for the production of innovations in finance and advanced service for firms, and as key marketplaces for capital.' (Sassen 1991, p. 338) . Sassen (1991) also recognises that these cities do not simply compete with each other, but function as one transterritorial marketplace. Sassen's (1991 Sassen's ( , 2001 ) focus on the provision of advanced services by global cities stresses that these cities function similarly as international financial centres, defined as localities with an intensive concentration of a wide variety of international financial businesses and transactions enjoying both agglomeration and scale economies in financial transactions (Kindleberger 2000; Z/Yen Ltd 2005 Castells' (1996) idea of a 'global network' of urban centres and Braudel's (1984) insight into the inherent monopolistic tendency of capitalism led Taylor (2000) to conceptualise world/global cities as the highly concentrated loci of 'unique knowledge complexes' that exploit their monopoly power based on economic reflexivity. He suggests that contemporary globalisation has led to a 'World City Network', defined as an interlocking network where cities are connected through the activities of trans-nodal agents, most importantly transnational advanced service firms. 'World city-ness' can then be measured in terms of the level of provision for advanced producer services relative to the top scoring city, or its 'interlock connectivity' (Taylor 2000 (Taylor , 2004 . A major advantage of Taylor's approach is that a city's 'world city-ness' can be objectively measured.
The chances for latecomers
The three perspectives referred to above have different implications for the prospects of new global cities in emerging economies. Although the World City Hypothesis itself has relatively little to say on this issue except that world cities only occur in core or semiperiphery regions (Friedmann 1986 ), the world-systems theoretical framework is nevertheless insightful. The framework conceptualises the contemporary world economy as a hierarchy, within which participating areas play differentiated roles either as core, semi-periphery, or periphery. While the core areas have more core-like (defined as monopolistic and highly profitable) production processes (e.g. finance) and strong states, the periphery areas have more periphery-like (defined as competitive and less profitable) production processes and weaker states. In contrast, the semi-periphery is in transition towards the core, and is therefore the most dynamic type of area (Wallerstein 2004) .
Thus the chance of global city formation in an emerging economy depends on the progress of its national economy, and, in turn this formation can strengthen the home economy's bid to raise its position.
The Global City Model (Sassen 2001) has somewhat different implications. Since it regards global cities as the production sites of highly specialised corporate services and financial innovations, and as marketplaces for these services and products, there is greater room for manoeuvre at the city level. In other words, the fortunes of emerging national economies and their nascent global cities need not be synchronised theoretically. Much would depend on how quickly the city itself can develop the capability of corporate control, acquire the necessary infrastructure and lifestyle, and attract other market players. Studies of international financial centres suggest that, while the more established centres benefit from the forces of centralisation due to scale economies, agglomeration economies and their 'endowed capacities', newly emerging centres can, by contrast, benefit from the forces of decentralisation thanks to outsourcing, regionally specialised knowledge, and emerging localised demand associated with increasing inward foreign investment and fast economic growth. There is also scope for latecomers to increase their chances through policy initiatives (Jarvis 2011).
Finally, while the World City Network school is light on theorisation, it has done much to deepen our understanding of city' network connectivity and power, defining the last as both 'to power over' other cities and an ability to attract advanced service firms (Taylor 2004 ). In particular, a Globalising City Index has been formulated to distinguish two kinds of driving forces, namely 'place power' and 'network power', underpinning two types of globalising cities. While the first type draws power from being the headquarters (therefore command centres) of top firms in the world, the second type draws power from high connectivity (Taylor et al 2011) . This analysis implies that global city formation can benefit from either strengthening headquarter functions, or improving connectivity, or a combination of both. The experience of Tokyo (Hill and Kim 2000) and Singapore (Olds and Yeung 2004) help shed light on the prospects of Shanghai as a global city: they highlight the important role of a developmental state on the one hand, and the disadvantage of being an emerging global city on the other. The Chinese state is not a typical developmental state.
In comparison with the paradigmatic Japanese developmental state, the Chinese state is characterised by 'fragmented authoritarianism' arising from a tradition of administrative decentralisation, has weaker capacity, and is less inclined and able to work with the private sector because of its socialist ideology (Beeson 2009 ). Moreover and related to the ideological difference with the West, the Chinese state faces a much less permissive external environment compared to the Japanese state (ibid). This is further aggravated by the direct role of the state in emerging Chinese state-owned TNCs and sovereign funds (Wooldrige 2012). The implication is that China's path towards global ascendance is likely to be more contentious than Japan's. So Shanghai's will be similarly difficult in its pursuit of global city status relative to Tokyo's.
Weiss' (1998) emphasis on 'managed openness' and Chang (2003)'s institutionalist perspective on the role of the state in structural change are also relevant here. In the context of globalization and opening-up, 'managed openness' requires the state to adopt 'a framework of analysis and policy choice that is both "open" to the benefits of international economic flows and relationships, but "managed" in terms of their effects' (Weiss 1998, p. 127) . Following Michael Lind, Weiss (1997, p. 24) argues that efforts to maintain state power in the context of globalisation involve the 'reconstitution of power around the consolidation of domestic and international linkages' by building power alliances. The traditional 'integral state' is being replaced by a 'catalytic state'. Here states 'achieve their goals less by relying on their own resources than by assuming a dominant role in coalitions of states, transnational institutions, and private-sector groups.' Weiss suggests that the strength of a 'catalytic' state in external inter-state coalition depends critically on the strength of the state-business alliance at home. Here the state's capacity is strongly affected by its domestic public-private relationship. On the other hand, as an instance of effecting major structural change at the city level, state-led global city formation would oblige the state to show not only 'entrepreneurship in the sense of providing the "vision" for the future and building new institutions', but also to manage the conflicts which would inevitably arise during the process of any structural change (Chang 2003, p. 46) .
To sum up, state-led global city formation in an emerging economy could be considered part of the state's strategy to lift its national economy from the periphery to the core, as well as developing a knowledge-based economy in the city. Challenging the established global cities is necessarily a difficult process. The state not only has to act as the planner, institution-builder and interest mediator, but also has to change itself and the ways it works. These represent major challenges for an emerging economy, and even more so for a transitional economy, defined as moving from a planned economy to a market economy and having weak market-supporting institutions (IMF 2000) . In the case of China, while the party-state insists on dominant state ownership, which both underpins its domestic power, and draws economic strength from it, this also serves to alienate established international market players. How and to what extent has the state risen to these challenges? We seek to answer this question below by first examining the planning vision for Shanghai and the evidence of its progress as an emerging global city.
Shanghai as an Emerging Global City -State Strategies and Outcomes

Strategic visioning and institutional building by the state
Turning Shanghai into a global city has been characterised as a 'strategy-based state project' (Wu 2009 [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] was presented (see Table 1 for key planning targets).
The report proposes to turn Shanghai into 'an international economic central city' by 2010. for Shanghai (Taylor et al 2011) .
Thus the combination of the GFCI reports and the analysis of Taylor is any guide (Ryoichi 2011) , then Beijing stands a good chance.
Let us now turn to Shanghai's outcome in realising its strategic targets. Table 1 shows that Shanghai's performance has fallen short in several crucial areas. These include the number of foreign-funded financial institutions and transnational headquarters located in the city, the city's share in the domestic securities market and change in economic structure. However, Shanghai exceeded its planned targets in aggregate economic growth and economic openness. Socially, its population target was exceeded by 8 million: Shanghai's population has grown from 13m in 1993 to 23m by the end of 2010.
The next section focuses on the change in economic structure, especially the growth of financial and business services.
Structural change
Changing statistical definition before and after 2003 makes it difficult to identify precise structural changes over the past decade except at a broad level. However, several important changes are discernible. First, there has been a significant de-industrialisation.
The share of manufacturing in total employment fell by 8. (Table 1) . Shanghai has thus a long way to go to transform itself into a service-oriented or knowledge-based economy.
Second, employment in high-value specialised financial and business services is low and its growth flat. As Table 3 shows, only 5 out of a total of 16 sectors have aboveaverage labour productivity. In descending order, these are: finance; real estate; information, computing and software; public administration and social organisations; and industry. However, the share of employment in finance and real estate is low, respectively 2.08% and 3.43% in 2009. Moreover, both shares fell during the period. The fastest employment growth took place (in descending order) in scientific research and technical services; information, computing and software; leasing and business services; accommodation and restaurants; retail and wholesale trade. With the exception of information, computing and software, however, these all have below-average levels of productivity (Table 3) . Third, judged by productivity and employment increases, only two sectors, i.e. retail and wholesale trade, and leasing and business services, stand out: over 2003-2009, their productivity rose by 119% and 166% respectively and their employment by 615,200 and 338,600 respectively. However, both sectors' productivities are below average, which indicates that they are unlikely to be serving high-end international customers. On the other hand, while the sector of information, computing and software registered the third highest productivity and added 119,000 jobs over 2003-2009, its productivity declined over this period. Moreover, its share in total employment is still very small (2% in 2009).
Finally, the category of transport, storage and postal services and telecommunication, important to the 'Four Centres' function, lost employment weight and experienced belowaverage productivity growth. In summary, it would seem that Shanghai has had rather limited success in developing specialised producer services.
Economic Growth
Shanghai's smaller economic size relative to Hong Kong was once considered as an important disadvantage (Shi & Hamnett 2002) . However, in the past two decades, The above examination shows that, although Shanghai has made some progress in global city formation and in enlarging its economy, it is still limited in developing specialised financial and business services, not to mention global control capability. IAs an emerging global city, it is still overshadowed by Hong Kong, and is behind Beijing in important ways. Structurally, Shanghai's transition from an industry-oriented economy to a service-oriented economy has only just begun. These are the consequences of the many constraints on the local and central state's capacity to intervene. Kong, which officially retains a capitalist system until 2047, to manage China's financial internationalisation. Thus Shanghai is unable to benefit from the historic opportunity of internationalising the renminbi, at least for the moment.
Central-local politics
Both theory (Jessop 1990; Friedmann 1986; Olds and Yeung 2004) Kong and its hinterland, the Pearl River Delta (Sung 2011 (Wang 2011) . As a consequence, the real estate sector has stagnated in Shanghai in recent years (Table 3) .
On the other hand, as shown earlier, Shanghai has found it difficult to reduce more quickly its large manufacturing sector to replace it with high-value service jobs. It has failed to add jobs where labour productivity is high and only succeeded where productivity is relatively low. It has also been weak in creating jobs in education, health, personal and social services (Table 3) . Thus Shanghai has been slow in developing 'knowledge complexes'.
There is also strong evidence that policy actions by the Municipality have at times been 
Conclusions
Despite persistent efforts by the local authority and rising national economic power, Shanghai's progress in global city formation is relatively slow. This is due to the numerous external and internal constraints that the city government is under, as well as underlying economic barriers. While some of the constraints (e.g. dominant state ownership; the West's hostility) are specific to China, numerous others, including:
(i) the relatively under-developed condition of the market and institutions;
(ii) competition from other domestic cities;
(iii) national-local politics, as well as (iv) the inherent difficulty in developing knowledge complexes and global corporate control capability in a transitional emerging economy context; may apply to other emerging global cities.
Nevertheless, the rise of Hong Kong, Beijing and Shanghai shows that there is good prospect for emerging global cities. Moreover, the central state can play an important role by stimulating economic growth and implementing liberalisation. In particular, like Tokyo and Seoul, Beijing's ascendance shows that fostering domestic TNCs is at least as important as attracting other TNCs.
As for the global/world city scholarship, this study demonstrates that greater attention needs to be paid to studying the dynamics of how fast economic growth, domestic socioeconomic characteristics, activities of home-grown TNCs and emerging economies' internationalisation strategies can significantly influence global city formation.
